Key Legislative Changes Impacting New York’s Motor Vehicle Cases

On May 26, 2026, New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed into law sweeping legislation, some of which was aimed at tort reform. In particular, these changes affect motor vehicle cases, including commercial motor vehicle cases, that are filed May 26, 2026 or later.

Modified Comparative Negligence

New York is known for its pure comparative negligence scheme. Under a pure comparative negligence scheme, even if a plaintiff is found 99% negligent, the plaintiff can still recover 1% of the awarded damages. However, there is a now a new exception if the plaintiff is seeking to recover damages arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in New York State. In particular, this new law, Civil Practice Law & Rule 1411(b), states as follows:

(b) In any action to recover damages for personal injury subject to article fifty-one of the insurance law, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant shall bar recovery if the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant is greater than the culpable conduct of the person against whom recovery is sought or is greater than the combined culpable conduct of the persons against whom recovery is sought.
CPLR 1411(b)

Personal injuries arising out of a negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in New York State are subject to Article 51 of the Insurance Law. Therefore, motor vehicle cases, including those involving commercial motor vehicles are now subject to this modified comparative negligence scheme. In short, if the plaintiff’s culpable conduct is greater than that of the defendants, the plaintiff will be barred from recovery. For example, in a case against a trucking company and its driver, if the truck driver is found to be 40% negligent and the plaintiff is found to be 60% negligent, the plaintiff will not recover any damages.

Changes to definition of “Serious Injury”

Under Section 5104 of the Insurance Law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the use of a motor vehicle in New York, there is no right of recovery for non-economic loss except in the case of a “serious injury.” The definition of “serious injury” previously included an injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature that prevented the plaintiff from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted their usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 out of 180 days following the accident.

The new legislation removes that language from the definition of serious injury. See NY Insurance Law Section 5102(d).  Serious injury is now limited to “death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; or significant limitation of uses of a body function or system.”

There are numerous low impact cases in which the plaintiff has sprains and strains, bulges, limited or conservative treatment, and/or is able to return to work just several months after the accident. Under the 90/180 day rule, such plaintiffs were often able to meet the definition of “serious injury” even though the injury is not permanent or otherwise does not meet the definition of serious injury. The removal of the “90 out of the first 180 days”  language is expected to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover for non-permanent injuries, especially those that conveniently keep a plaintiff treating for and out of work for just over three months.

Limitations on Non-Economic Loss for Certain Circumstances

A plaintiff who sustains a “serious injury’ as defined above and who is not barred from recovery under CPLR 1411(b) as defined above, will be limited to $100,000 in non-economic loss if the plaintiff was (1) operating a uninsured motor vehicle in which the insurance had lapsed 30 days or more; (2) operating a motor vehicle while impaired at the time of the accident and is convicted of such; or (3) operating a motor vehicle in the commission of a felony, or immediate flight therefrom, and is convicted of that felony.

Of the three specifically outlined circumstances, the most common one the lapse of insurance. If a claimant is found to have a lapse in their insurance, it will be crucial to determine the number of days it has lapsed. Presumably, the legislature was attempting to accommodate “mistakes” that may occur, i.e., payments delayed in the mail, delays over holidays, or other unintentional mistakes that may cause a temporary or short lapse of insurance coverage. However, if the vehicle has been uninsured for 30 days or more, then the claimant will be limited to the $100,000 non-economic loss.

Overall, these attempts at tort reform in New York were obviously intended to help reduce insurance rates in New York, which are notoriously high. However, the defense of commercial motor vehicles is greatly helped by this legislation. It will help reduce the exposure for the defendants in cases in which the claimants are at fault in whole or in part.  It will open up more opportunities for motions for summary judgment to eliminate the claims for on-economic loss on the “serious injury” threshold. Finally, it will assist in the defense in at least three ridiculous scenarios in which defendants always question why they could still be held liable.